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Sammendrag 
I denne artikkelen studerer vi effekten av finansielle incentiver på studentatferd i høyere utdanning. 
Studenter i Norge som fullførte enkelte studier på normert tid mellom høsten 1990 og 1995 fikk en 
reduksjon i studielånet på 18 000 kr fra Statens lånekasse for utdanning. Ved å sammenligne studenter 
ved berørte og ikke berørte studier (ved bruk av en forskjeller-i-forskjeller metode), finner vi at berørte 
studenter i snitt reduserte antall semester forsinket med 0,8 i reformperioden og med 1,5 semestre i de 
påfølgende to årene etter reformen.  Vi finner at hvert studieår under reformen reduserte antall 
semester forsinket med 0,23. I tillegg har vi noe indikasjon på at bruken av finansielle incentiver er 
mest effektive når de berører studenter tidlig i utdanningsløpet. Hva angår fullføring på normert tid 
finner vi at andelen økte med 3,8 prosent poeng for hvert reform år, fra et nivå på 20 prosent i 
perioden før reformen. En rekke robusthetssjekker tyder på at den estimerte effekten ikke gjenspeiler 
ulike trender eller utelatte variable.
1 Introduction
Because education is believed to have positive externalities, and to promote equality of oppor-
tunity, higher education is subsidized in many countries. This is the case wherever students
do not pay the full cost of their instruction through tuition. Moreover, several countries have
even stronger subsidies in that students' living expenses are also partly covered, either through
scholarships or through favorable student loans provided by government agencies. From hu-
man capital theory, we would expect subsidies to increase the net return to education and help
to oﬀset credit constraints. However, the presence of subsidies to education may not only in-
crease students' attainment level, but also inﬂuence the level of eﬀort provided by students. As
students are generally subsidized for each unit of time spent studying, and not for the degree
attained, there may be incentives to spend too much time in the educational system. This
may be particularly important if the consumption value, i.e., the private, non-pecuniary return
to education, is a dominant factor behind the students' choice of study duration (Alstadsæter
and Sivertsen, 2010; Zafar, 2009). In this case, a higher level of student support may ﬁnance
increased consumption of higher education, with few externalities.
It is indeed observed that many students enrolled in universities and college programs around
the world do not complete their university or college degree on time. According to the U.S. De-
partment of Education (2003), ﬁrst-time recipients of bachelor's degrees between 1999 and 2000
spent on average 10 extra months ﬁnishing their degree beyond the estimated completion time.
Similar patterns are documented for many European countries (Brunello and Winter-Ebmer,
2003). This result, together with the general belief that students do not exert suﬃcient study
eﬀort, has increased researchers' interest in whether students respond to ﬁnancial incentives.
The evidence in this area is mixed and remains limited.
This paper studies the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on study duration using rich register
data to investigate the eﬀect of a reform that rewarded students who completed their higher
education degree nominally on time. The reform entitled students in Norway who completed
certain graduate study programs between the autumn semester of 1991 and the autumn semester
of 1995 to a restitution of approximately 18,000 NOK (about 3000 USD and 34 percent of the
average yearly loan) from the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund if they ﬁnished the
program on nominal time. This reform was among the ﬁrst to focus on the intensive margin,
explicitly aiming at inducing students to succeed and thereby improve the eﬃciency of higher
education. Earlier reforms had only been concerned with the design of students' support system
(loans and grants) related to the extensive margin, such as increasing enrollment and access to
higher education by providing a subsidy to all students independent of performance.
The reform created sharp discontinuities in the ﬁnancial incentives that the autumn 1990 to
1995 graduation cohorts faced compared to previous and subsequent cohorts. These discontinu-
ities can be exploited to estimate the impact of the ﬁnancial reward on study duration. Similar
to all research designs that depend on a reform, confounding time eﬀects are a potential threat.
However, the fact that students enrolled in some education programs were not eligible for the
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restitution provides an additional comparison group that will allow a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach that can control for such confounding time eﬀects.
This paper contributes to the literature by being one of the few papers addressing the
causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on study duration among students at the university level.
Moreover, it includes the whole student population in Norwegian higher education institutions.
Previous papers with a credible research design have typically only focused on students from
one particular ﬁeld of study or university. Finally, it is also the ﬁrst paper to directly address
number of semesters delayed as dependent variable (previous papers have focused on graduation
on time and student achievement).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature
on study duration in higher education. Section 3 provides some background on the higher
education system in Norway, the student support system and the ﬁnancial incentive reform.
Section 4 presents the data, while section 5 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents
the ﬁndings and section 7 oﬀers some conclusions.
2 Related Literature
The empirical literature on study duration in higher education has mainly focused on two
issues: (i) The relationship between student aid and the demand side for higher education, i.e.,
the extensive margin and how ﬁnancial subsidies can increase enrollment and investment in
higher education, (ii) How to improve the eﬀectiveness of higher education production by giving
students ﬁnancial incentives related to nominal study duration or academic performance.
Governments' student loans and grants make it easier for students to obtain higher education.
Many studies have been conducted to measure the eﬀect of these student-aid programs. For
instance, Dynarski (2003) ﬁnds that college attendance dropped by more than one-third of a year
and schooling by two-thirds of a year after a shift in the ﬁnancial aid policy in the United States in
1992 in which Congress eliminated the Social Security student beneﬁt program. Dynarski (2004)
also studies the eﬀect of new scholarships in the United States. Whereas traditional scholarships
are often limited to high-performing students, new merit aid programs in the United States
require relatively modest academic credentials. Dynarski (2004) provides evidence that most
of these new merit aid programs have contributed to close racial and ethnic gaps in university
attendance.
Skyt-Nielsen, Sørensen and Taber (2010) investigate the change in demand for college result-
ing from a Danish student aid reform. Their ﬁndings indicate that enrollment increases with
higher subsidies, although enrollment is less responsive than has been reported in other studies
and countries. They argue that one reason for this diﬀerence may be that large subsidies were
in place in Denmark prior to the reform. Borrowing constraints seem to deter college enrollment
only to a minor extent.
More recently, the potential of ﬁnancial incentives to increase students' study eﬃciency
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and performance has attracted attention. Financial incentives may be implemented through
direct money incentives, reduction in tuition fees or forgiveness of student loans depending on
academic results, or in our case, the time to degree. The literature in this domain is relatively
small and scattered. Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van der Klaauw (2010) implement a randomized
experiment among ﬁrst-year economics students in Amsterdam where students who passed all of
their ﬁrst-year requirements on time could earn a reward of 750 Euros. This incentive increased
performance for higher-ability students, but they also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect for less able students.
Using a regression discontinuity design on data from Bocconi University in Italy, Garibaldi,
Giavazzi, Ichino and Rettore (2007) show that if tuition in the last year of the program is raised
by 1,000 Euros, the probability of late graduation decreases by 6.1 percentage points with respect
to a benchmark average probability of 80 percent. Common for these two latter studies only
use data for one particular university or ﬁeld of study.
More in line with our study, Häkkinen and Uusitalo (2003) evaluate the eﬀect of a student
aid reform in Finland that was intended to shorten the duration of university studies. The
reform relied on a new system that replaced the old loan-based student aid system with a
system of grants. The reform had only a modest eﬀect that was limited to ﬁelds with relatively
long durations of education. Furthermore, most of the decline in the observed time to degree
can be explained by an increase in the unemployment rate that reduced student employment
opportunities. In the same spirit, Heineck, Kifmann and Lorenz (2006) apply a duration analysis
to examine the eﬀects on study duration of an additional tuition fee for students enrolled in
university programs (in Germany) beyond the regular completion time. Their ﬁndings are
ambiguous, however. Unlike our study, both Häkkinen and Uusitalo and Heineck et al. cannot
fully control for confounding time factors as they only compare students before and after the
reform.
There is also some evidence that observed excess time to graduation may be explained by
labor market variables (such as wage diﬀerentials and employment protection) and attributes of
the funding scheme of tertiary education. By using data on European countries, Brunello and
Winter-Ebmer (2003) ﬁnd a negative association between wage compression completing college
on time, and that excess time to graduation is signiﬁcantly higher in countries with stricter
employment protection. Bound, Lovenheim and Turner (2007) provide evidence that increased
stratiﬁcation in U.S. higher education and reduced availability of resources to institutions below
the top tier, are the main explanations for the observed increase in time to degree. Joensen
(2011) establishes a structural model where students may study and work simultaneously. She
ﬁnds that there are non-linear eﬀect of students' working hours on academic achievement, and
bonuses related to merit aid or on-time-graduation can be eﬀective to amend academic outcomes
such as graduation rates and time-to-graduation.
Not much is known about the optimal length of studying to obtain a certain degree. One
exception is Brodaty, Gary-Bobo and Prieto (2008) who provide evidence that individuals in
France with longer than average time-to-graduation have signiﬁcantly lower wages and employ-
ment rates in their early career, indicating that speed signals ability.
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3 Institutional settings and the turbo reform
3.1 Higher education in Norway
The Norwegian higher education sector is almost completely dominated by public institutions,
which have 85 percent of enrolled students. Tuition fees are virtually zero, making the direct
costs of higher education very low.1 There are three diﬀerent types of higher education insti-
tutions: universities, specialized university colleges and regional university colleges. All three
types oﬀer courses at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.
During the 1990s, undergraduate programs typically lasted up to four years, and most gradu-
ate programs had a total duration of ﬁve to six years. Most students at regional colleges enrolled
in two- or three-year professionally oriented programs (e.g., nursing, teaching, engineering and
commerce), whereas students in specialized university colleges mostly enroll in four- to six-year
programs in specialized ﬁelds, such as business, architecture and veterinary science. Universities
used to oﬀer two tracks: integrated ﬁve- or six-year programs leading to a graduate degree (e.g.,
medicine, theological seminary and civil engineering) or shorter programs in diﬀerent ﬁelds that
could be combined to eventually earn a Master's degree. Such a Master's degree typically con-
sisted of two parts; a relevant undergraduate degree which lasted for three to four years, and
a graduate degree with a duration of one and a half or two years. Thus, the total stipulated
duration of these degrees, including the undergraduate degree, was ﬁve or six years. This latter
study program bears some resemblance to the American university system, although there was
no core curriculum for undergraduates in Norway. Students in Norway who wished to begin
a graduate program had to complete a related undergraduate program.2
3.2 The Norwegian state educational loan fund
To further promote equality of opportunity in higher education irrespective of family back-
ground, the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund oﬀers favorable loans to students who
enroll in higher education programs. This type of support is meant to cover the students' costs
of living, such as housing and food, during the study period. The loan terms are favorable
in several respects. No interest is calculated, and no repayment is required until the student
has completed his/her education and entered the labor market. Also, the loan may be fully or
partially waived if the student, for one or another reason, does not have suﬃcient income after
completing his/her education. In the case of death, the loan is waived.
The Norwegian Parliament decides every year how much money to assign to students during
the subsequent school year, generally adjusting this amount to keep up with students' costs
1The single important exception to this rule is a private business school that accounts for about 10 percent
of the students and charges signiﬁcant tuition fees.
2Since 2003, following the Bologna reform, most educational programs have been streamlined into three-year
Bachelor's degrees and ﬁve-year Master's degrees. Moreover, the formal distinction between specialized and
regional university colleges is recent, but reﬂects a diﬀerence that was also present during the 1990s. Also,
since 2005 the number of universities has increased from four to eight through the conversion of one specialized
university institutions and three regional university colleges.
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of living. This sum, which amounted to 54,000 NOK (about 9,000 USD) for the 1991/1992
academic year (about 42,000 NOK of this sum was given as a loan, and the remaining 12,000
NOK was a grant),3 is the same for all students and is not aﬀected by parental income. On
the other hand, ﬁnancial support has for long been need-based and depends on students' own
income and wealth.
The grant and interest beneﬁt represent free money to the students, hence the fraction of
students in higher education who take up loans is close to 100 percent. Berg (1997) reports that
97 percent of students graduating with a higher degree receive support from the Norwegian State
Educational Loan Fund at some time. The average loan amount per student was approximately
155,000 NOK for students completing higher education in 1994. Note that this is an average for
student with shorter and higher degrees. For the students we consider, who have higher degrees,
the average loan is likely to be higher.
3.3 The turbo reform
Students in Norway who completed certain graduate education programs between autumn 1990
and autumn 1995 were entitled to restitution from the Norwegian State Educational Loan fund
if they graduated on stipulated time. The restitution was 18000 NOK (about 3000 USD). The
reform was announced as a part of the 1991 National Budget. The proposed budget was made
public in October 1990, and passed in November/December. Searching newspaper archives, we
have found no indication that the reform was expected or even discussed before announced in
the National Budget. On the contrary, according to newspaper reports there were even some
uncertainties related to the implementation of the reform. The political situation in Norway
was unclear during the autumn 1990. The center-right minority government that had proposed
the restitution ceded oﬃce to the Labor party in early November, i.e., before the 1991 National
Budget was passed. The Labor party apparently was opposed to the reform, but voted in favor
of it by a mistake. The new system was introduced in the regulations for the State Educational
Loan Fund from July 1991. Students graduating on stipulated time in autumn 1990 and spring
1991 beneﬁted from the new incentive scheme.
The termination of the reform was announced in summer 1995, and the last students who
could beneﬁt from the reform was the autumn 1995 graduation cohort.4 The reform was contro-
versial throughout its lifetime, and even proposed discontinued in the 1994 National Budget, but
at that time continued by the national assembly. Until its termination the future of the reform
was uncertain. Shortly before it was discontinued it was expected that a similar policy would
be introduced in its place. However, this did not happen. Thus, it is unclear what expectations
students during the reform period had about the future of the reform.
The reform created sharp discontinuities in the ﬁnancial incentives that the autumn 1990
to autumn 1995 graduation cohorts faced compared to previous and subsequent cohorts. We
3Source: This ﬁgure and the following ﬁgures concerning loans and grants are taken from the website of the
Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund, http://www.lanekassen.no/, unless stated otherwise.
4See White Paper number 14 (1993-94).
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will exploit these discontinuities to estimate the impact of ﬁnancial reward on study duration.
The autumn 1990 graduates had little time to respond to the changed incentives, and it was
at that time still unclear whether the reform would actually be implemented. For this reason
we denote the period from spring 1991 to autumn 1995 as the treatment period. Conveniently
for our analysis, students in some education programs were not eligible for the restitution (see
below). This rule provides a comparison group that can be used in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach that corrects for confounding time eﬀects.
From 1988 to 2003, students who opted for any longer study programs lasting 10- to 13-
semesters were entitled to another restitution that was not linked to time to degree, but degree
completion. The restitution was increasing with the length of the study program, ranging
from around 19 000 NOK for 10-semester programs to 46 000 NOK for 13-semester programs.
However, as this reform aﬀected all students equally, we do not expect it to bias our diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimate.
3.4 What should we expect of this reform?
The extent to which students respond to such a reform depends on the design of the ﬁnancial
incentive: The reform entitled students who completed certain graduate study programs to a
restitution of 18,000 NOK from the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund if they completed
their studies on stipulated time. The reward was hence received after at least ﬁve years of
studying and corresponded (for the average student) to about 10 percent of the total loan
amount.
Building on incentive theory, we know that incentives are more likely to be eﬀective when
the award are given on shorter terms. That is, when the reward comes more quickly, perhaps
at the end of every term, and not after more than ﬁve years in the higher education system, as
in our case (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987). In addition, the form taken by the subsidy itself -
no direct cash reward, but a loan reduction (where the remainder is repaid and discounted over
several years) - might be perceived as a somewhat low-powered incentive.
On the other hand, students might be quite constrained ﬁnancially, that is, 18, 000 NOK in
loan reduction is perceived as a larger sum of money than it is for an average worker, and hence
students might be more willing to respond to the incentive than other types of individuals. More-
over, the educational outcome being incentivized, i.e., study duration, might be something that
students can quite easily adjust without suﬀering excessive eﬀort costs. In addition, students
understand the mapping between study eﬀort and the study duration, so the responsiveness of
the students' eﬀort to the incentive should be quite good.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use register data from Statistics Norway, consisting of all students who were predicted (or
expected) to graduate from Norwegian higher education institutions between 1983 and 1997.
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The data source is the Norwegian National Education Database. The database builds on data
from the 1960 and 1970 censuses, and has been continually updated since 1974. From 1974
onwards, the data are reported directly from the educational institutions to Statistics Norway
and are thus considered to be very accurate. However, a large number of individuals have 1974
or 1975 as their registered ﬁrst entry into higher education, even though they in reality started
earlier. To get accurate measures of time of enrollment, graduation and semesters delayed, we
begin our sample with students who were predicted to graduate in 1983. These students enrolled
in higher education in 1976 or later. As the the admission system to higher education changed in
1993, the last students we include in our sample are the predicted 1997-graduates (who enrolled
in 1992 or earlier).
In the remainder of the paper we will denote predicted graduation year simply as graduation
year. An individual student's graduation year is then his or her year of ﬁrst entry in higher
education plus the length of the education program the student enrolled in. For each student
we have information on whether the student completed a higher degree or not, and in case
of completion, whether graduation was on time, and number of semesters delayed. Note that
graduation on time and semesters delayed relate to the completed program, which may diﬀer
from the one the student enrolled in. These variables are calculated by comparing the stipulated
duration of the completed program with the total time spent studying. Thus, in the case of
students changing programs, semesters delayed do not only include those spent on the ﬁnal
program. Not completed means that we do not have any record of the student completing a
higher degree. We observe the students until 2007, i.e., at least ten more years after predicted
graduation.
Students who are not observed to complete get the value zero on the on-time completion
variable. Furthermore, we truncate number of semesters delayed at the 5th and 95th percentile.
These correspond to -2, i.e., 2 semesters before stipulated completion, and 12 semesters, respec-
tively. This truncates a small number of positive and negative outliers, that may be the result
of coding errors. We do not expect this to have much inﬂuence on our results, as relatively
few observations are aﬀected, and even fewer by more than a few semesters. Furthermore, the
incentive is unlikely to have much impact when the student already is ﬁnishing on or before
time, or much delayed. Estimating the reform eﬀect for our truncated variable, the original
untruncated and two alternative truncated variables conﬁrms that this has little impact on our
results. However, setting an upper limit to the number of semesters delayed allows consistent
treatment of students who did not complete any higher education. We consider these to be
maximum delayed (and impute using the 95th percentile).
In addition to data on enrollment in and completion of higher education, we also have
background characteristics such as the student's age, gender and parental education.5 Students
who were younger than 18 or older than 21 when graduating from high school (about 30 percent
of the sample) are excluded from the sample. About 76 percent of these are dropped due to
5As non-Western immigrants amount to less than 1 percent of the sample, we choose not to control for
immigrant status.
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Table 1: Distribution of students across the diﬀerent education programs
Length of ed program No of Percent
(Years) students
Treatment group (N=36,377)
Science (cand.scient) 5.5 8,736 24.02
Humanities (cand.philo) 6 8,194 22.53
Law (cand.jur) 6 8,146 22.39
Social sciences (cand.polit) 6 5,736 15.77
Psychology (cand.psychol) 6.5 1,820 5.00
Dentistry (cand.odont) 5 1,385 3.81
Theological seminar (cand.theol) 6 1,197 3.29
Economics (cand.oecon) 5.5 1,081 2.97
Arts (music) (cand.musicae) 6 82 0.23
Control group (N=9,989)
Medicine (cand.med) 6 4,505 45.10
Agronomy (cand.agric) 5 3,904 39.08
Veterinary science (cand.med.vet) 6 617 6.18
Pharmaceutical science (cand.pharm) 5 608 6.09
Educational science (cand.paed) 6.5 355 3.55
missing information on date of completion of high school. These are mainly elderly people and
immigrants. Some programs do not have a clear reform status, either because it is not clear from
the regulations whether students enrolled in the program qualiﬁed for restitution or because the
reform status changed during the reform period. This amounts to 45 percent of the students
in our sample. Almost 60 percent of this number comprises students studying civil engineering.
Education programs in civil engineering became eligible for restitution at a later time than other
programs did. The second and third largest groups, totaling about 34 percent of the excluded
students, are two groups of students enrolled in unspeciﬁed higher education programs. We
exclude students enrolled in these programs. The total number of students in our sample is
46,366. Appendix Table A.1 gives an descriptive overview of the main variables used in this
analysis.
Table 1 shows how the students are distributed across the diﬀerent education programs. The
programs aﬀected by the reform (the treatment group) mainly are law, science, humanities and
social sciences. A majority of these programs were non-integrated study programs (i.e., separate
undergraduate and graduate degrees), where the last or two last years were devoted to write
a master thesis. The programs not aﬀected by the reform (the control group) consist mainly
of integrated ﬁve- or six year programs, medicine and agronomy being the two most important
once. A majority of the students in the treatment group were enrolled in 12-semester programs
(i.e., six years), while students in the control group are equally divided across 10 (ﬁve years)-
and 12 - semester programs.
Although the reform gave an incentive to graduate on time, our main outcome variable will
be the number of semesters delayed. The average delay for the students in our sample is 5.0
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Figure 1: Number of semesters delayed, 1983 to 1997.
semesters (standard deviation equals 4.7). This variable provide a more precise indication of the
extent to which the reform triggered students to increase their study eﬀort, and hence reduce
excess time. It captures the overall change in study behavior, not only whether the student
succeed in reducing reducing delay from positive to zero. Also, semesters delayed is the most
policy-relevant variable as it gives a better indication of private and social cost associated with
late graduation.6 For completeness we also investigate whether more students did complete on
time. This will give us an indication of the share of students who increased their study eﬀort
enough to actually get the bonus. Finally, we check if the reform had an eﬀect on completing
at all. About 75 percent of the students in our sample did not complete on time, whereas about
19 percent did not complete at all.
In Figure 1, we show how numbers of semesters delayed changed for students with graduation
ranging from 1983 to 1997 separately for the treatment and the control group. During the whole
period, the number of semesters delayed is lower in the control group than in the treatment
group. However, the fraction of students delaying their studies declined in the treatment group
during the reform period (autumn 1990 to autumn 1995). In contrast, the control group is
associated with a upward trend in the same period. Before the reform both groups follow a
similar pattern.
6While we are able to calculate the cost to treat (see section 6), we can not say much about the cost-beneﬁt of
the reform, because we do not know the costs and beneﬁts of delayed graduation. For instance, the consumption
value of attending university is hard to evaluate, and more time in higher education may have a productivity
eﬀect, irrespectively of degree earned. The cost will include direct teaching costs (which may be small for
the relevant programs) as well the opportunity cost of the students' time and loss of experience accumulation.
However, this may be (partly) oﬀset if the students work while studying.
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Table 2: Average number of years spent studying under the reform, by year of graduation and
treatment status
Control Group Treatment Group Total
1983-1990 0.000 0.000 0.000
1991 1.000 1.000 1.000
1992 2.000 2.000 2.000
1993 3.000 3.000 3.000
1994 4.000 4.000 4.000
1995 5.000 5.000 5.000
1996 4.542 4.972 4.902
1997 3.587 4.026 3.941
Total 1.713 2.218 2.109
The degree of exposure to the reform varies considerably between students in our sample,
thus we will allow the eﬀect of the reform to depend on years studied during the reform, as
detailed in the next section. In the remainder of the paper we will denote year studied during
the reform as years treated, for students both in the treatment and control groups. We measure
years treated as the number of years a student was in higher education under the reform,
without having passed her predicted graduation time. When a student passes the predicted
time of graduation, she or he is delayed, and thus no longer eligible for the restitution, i.e., the
treatment ends. With the treatment period ranging from 1991 to 1995, the maximum value of
years treated is ﬁve years. In our sample, 19 percent of the students were enrolled during the
whole reform-period, ﬁve years. 18 percent were enrolled for four years, whereas 42 percent had
their graduation before the reform (see Appendix Table A.2).
In Table 2 we report the average number of years treated during the reform by year of grad-
uation, separately for students in the treatment and control groups. Students with graduation
in 1990 or earlier did not have any chance to respond to the reform. Students who graduated
in 1991 were enrolled one year under the reform, having some opportunity to react, and so
on. Because of the short life of the reform relative to the length of the study programs, the
last students to graduate under the reform would largely have started before its introduction.
Furthermore, the ﬁrst students to graduate after the termination of the reform would mostly
have enrolled before or concurrently with the introduction of the reform. Thus, a majority of
these student would be treated during the entire reform, i.e. ﬁve years. For each year after the
reform ended, graduates' ﬁrst enrollment will be later, and reform exposure less. Our sample
ends with the 1997-graduates, who were enrolled about four years under the reform. Note that
the number of years enrolled under the reform is somewhat less in the control group, were the
programs on average are of somewhat shorter duration.
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5 Empirical approach
To estimate the eﬀect of the turbo reform we will rely on the following diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
framework. Di is a dummy variable that equals one if student i is in the treated programs and
zero if he/she belongs to the control group:
yit = α+ φDi + dt + ηT
T
it + γ1(Di · TTit ) + γ2(Di · dTt ) + γ3(Di · dPTt ) + βXi + εit (1)
The outcome variable yit measures how many semesters student i is delayed. T
T
it is years treated,
as discussed in the previous section. dt is a set of dummy variables for graduation year, d
T
t is a
dummy variable equal to one if graduation year is during the reform period, dPTt is a dummy
variable equal to one if graduation year is after the reform period (1996-1997). Xi is a vector
of covariates such as dummy variables for age, gender, length of the study program and parental
education (described in Appendix A.1), and it is a random error term. As already mentioned,
we will also look at two additional outcome variables, namely completing on time and completing
at all.
Our critical assumption is that, absent any reform, treatment and control follow similar
trends. This allows us to use the control group to control for time-variation unrelated to the
reform and to estimate the reform eﬀect as a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence. As discussed in relation
to Figure 1, we believe this assumption is reasonable.
Our parameters of interest are the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences parameters γ1, γ2 and γ3. γ1
measures the reform eﬀect for each year treated, and is expected to be negative (less delay with
more treatment).γ2 and γ3 capture that the eﬀect of the reform may not be proportional with
time treated.7 That is, to allow for more general eﬀects, we add interaction terms between the
dummy variable for being in the treatment group and the dummy variables for whether the
student's graduation year was during or right after the reform period. Hence, the respective
reform eﬀects for students with graduation during and after the reform period become γ1T
T
it +γ2
and γ1T
T
it + γ3. Conditional on the eﬀect of years treated (γ1), γ2 and γ3 capture, among other
things, the potential eﬀect timing of the incentive may have on semesters delayed. If being
treated late in the study progression is more important than being treated early (e.g. because
delays tend to arise in the last part of a degree), the eﬀect of the incentive should be larger
for students graduating during the reform-period than for students graduating after the reform-
period, γ2 < γ3 (i.e., more of a reduction in delay for those graduating during the reform period).
Likewise, if the opposite is the case (e.g. because of habit formation in early studying years),
γ3 < γ2.
However, given that the eﬀect of the reform need not be proportional to years treated, we
do not have any clear a priori expectation of neither signs nor the relative magnitudes of γ2
7The reform eﬀect need not even be linear, however, as the range in years untreated is not very great, the
linear approximation used is likely to be reasonably good.
14
and γ3.
8 Furthermore, γ3 < γ2 could also reﬂect a change in study norms where there is a
persistent reform eﬀect, e.g. because excess time is less accepted among peers or potential
employers. While the estimated values may give indications of which of the above stories are
the more relevant ones, we can not with any degree of certainty distinguish between potential
mechanisms. In particular, as we do not have any post-reform students that are not treated to
a large degree in our sample, it is hard to judge if there is any persistent eﬀect for non-treated
students.
As previous research has found diﬀerent eﬀects for high and low ability students (Leuven
et al., 2010), we also estimate models where we interact years treated with a dummy variable
for whether at least one of the parents have a higher degree (corresponding to 15+ years of
schooling, the dummy variable is denoted Hi).
yit = α+ φDi + dt + ηT
T
it + γ1(Di · TTit ) + γ2(Di · dTt ) + γ3(Di · dPTt )
+γH1 (Di · TTit ·Hi) + θ1(Di ·Hi) + θ2(TTit ·Hi) + βXi + εit
(2)
In Equation (2) the estimated reform eﬀect for a student stipulated to graduate in the reform
period is (γ1 + γ
H
1 ·Hi) · TTit + γ2 (similarly with γ3 replacing γ2 for a student with stipulated
graduation after the reform), i.e., it is allowed to vary with parental education. Note that we let
the dependency of the reform eﬀect on graduation during/after the reform period be the same,
irrespective of parental education.
With diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences studies there is always a concern that the estimates are altered
by diﬀerential time trends or other shocks. To check the robustness of the reform eﬀects, we
investigate the trends in study duration for all three outcome variables both before and after the
reform period for the treatment and control groups. We do this by estimating a more general
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences equation than equation (1) containing year-speciﬁc eﬀects (so-called
placebo "reform" eﬀects).
yit = α+ φDi + dt + ηT
T
it + γ˜t(Di · dt) + βXi + εit (3)
In this speciﬁcation, we replace the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences parameter γ1 with a vector of year-
speciﬁc parameters γ˜t. Thus, the average reform eﬀect for a student with stipulated graduation
in year t is now given as γ˜t, where it in equation (1) would be γ1 · TTit + γ2 · dTt + γ3 · dPTt . Note
however that testing for (placebo) "reform eﬀects" is only relevant before the introduction of the
reform. As already discussed, given the short time-span of the reform, students graduating after
the termination of the reform may have reduced their time to degree. Thus, any evidence of a
persistent eﬀect after the reversal of the reform does not violate our common trends assump-
tion. Another reason for introducing year-speciﬁc diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences variables is that this
approach allows us to study the dynamics of the introduction of the reform in a more ﬂexible
8γ1TTit +γ2 and γ1T
T
it +γ3 will be linear approximations of the reform eﬀect. If the eﬀect of the reform is not
proportional to years treated, γ2 and γ3 can have any sign, depending on the deviation from proportionality. If
the eﬀect of treatment increases more (less) than proportionally with years treated we expect γ2 and γ3 to be
negative (positive).
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way.
The control group consists mainly of education programs that select students on grades from
upper secondary school. Once inside, the teaching tends to be classroom-like and strictly or-
ganized, where the students' progress is taken well care of. The treatment group, on the other
hand, mostly consists of education programs with low requirements for admission (humanities,
social sciences, science). The programs typically have a loosely organized structure, with little
tutoring, and with students being responsible for their own progression and graduation time.
This does not need to be a problem for the identiﬁcation of any reform eﬀects as we in our
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach control for any time-constant diﬀerence in the on-time gradu-
ation rates, as well as time-varying eﬀects that are shared between the groups. Still, in order
to study a treatment group more comparable to the control group, we will also look separately
at students in the cand.jur (law) program. While there were not strict admission requirement
in law, there was a cut-oﬀ after two years, such that the students completing a law degree were
a selected group.9 Furthermore, like the programs in the control group, the law program had a
very well-deﬁned structure and expected progression.
While we control for common year eﬀects, there is still a possibility that there are some
changes over time that diﬀer between treatment and control, and may impact on the outcome.
We address a number of such potential confounders both in the main speciﬁcation and in ro-
bustness checks. First, the composition of the groups may change over time. By including
covariates describing the students' family background in Xi we control for this to the extent
that such changes correlate with our observed characteristics. Second, the composition of the
treatment and control groups in terms of detailed programs may change over time. For exam-
ple, a response to the reform may be that more students may choose programs that are easy to
complete on time. We address this by adding program-speciﬁc eﬀects, and also program-speciﬁc
trends. Third, the number of students enrolled increases over time. Larger numbers of students
may mean that average student is weaker and that teaching quality decreases. Both should
contribute to increase delays. We address this by controlling for the log of each program's co-
hort size, and also allow the eﬀect of this variable to vary between the treatment and control
groups. Finally, conditions in the labor market might have inﬂuenced the treatment and control
groups diﬀerently (e.g. Häkkinen and Uusitalo, 2003).10 As a ﬁnal robustness check, we will
control for the (national) unemployment rate. Because we only have yearly unemployment data
we estimate and control for the diﬀerence between the treatment and control groups in eﬀect of
unemployment.11
9Only students with grade B or better on their two-year exam could continue to study law.
10The period under investigation started with a quite strong recession but the economy started to boom around
1993.
11The eﬀect of unemployment on the control group will of course be captured by the year eﬀects.
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6 Results
Column (1) - (4) in Table 3 report diﬀerent variations of Equation (1). In the ﬁrst column
we disregard years treated and only estimate the eﬀect of graduating during or right after
the reform-period, i.e. γ2 and γ3. On average, delays were reduced by 0.81 semesters during
the reform period, and by 1.52 semesters in the ﬁrst two post-reform years. Both eﬀects are
statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Modeling the reform eﬀect as proportional to
years treated, γ1 (column (2)), each year of treatment reduces delay by 0.28 semesters. This
eﬀect is also statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level, and amounts to 1.4 semesters for
a student who is treated during the entire duration of the reform (0.28*5 years). Note that the
baseline diﬀerence between the treatment and control groups is as high as 3.7 semesters, thus,
even though the reform eﬀect is substantial, it far from eliminates the diﬀerence between the
groups.
The more ﬂexible speciﬁcation in column (3) (including γ1, γ2 and γ3) reduces the eﬀect
of each year treated marginally to 0.23 . On the other hand, both γ2 and γ3 are reduced
substantially, compared to column (1). This suggests that the reform eﬀect mostly depends
on the amount of time treated, rather than the timing of the incentive, i.e. whether a student
graduated during the reform or after the reform ended. However, γ2 and γ3 contribute to a larger
reform eﬀect, as they are still negative, if not signiﬁcant. Although γ2 and γ3 are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent, the larger absolute value of γ3 may suggest that early treatment is important.
Controlling for gender and background variables in column (4) does not change the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimates much, indicating that observable characteristics do not inﬂuence the
treatment group and the control group diﬀerently. This result also indicates that the relative
composition of the treatment and control groups in terms of individual characteristics do not
change over time. As for the estimated coeﬃcients on the background variables, male students
and students of higher-educated parents are on average less delayed than female students and
students whose parents have shorter education.
Column (5) in the same table present results from estimating Equation (2) where we interact
the dummy variable for whether at least one of the parents have higher education with number
of years treated. There are no indications that the eﬀect diﬀers across students from diﬀerent
background, as the point estimate is close to zero and also not statistically signiﬁcant.
To investigate the relationship between ﬁnancial incentives and study duration further, we
also look at other outcome variables than the number of semesters delayed. The results are
reported in Table 4. Apart from the dependent variable, the models presented are equivalent to
the model in column (4) in Table 3 .12
As the bonus attached to the ﬁnancial incentive was given to students who completed their
studies on time we start out by regressing the reform eﬀects on a dummy variable indicating
whether the student has graduated on time or not, see column (1). The share of students
12These models are estimated with a linear probability model, using a logit model does not change our con-
clusions.
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Table 4: The eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on completing on time and completing at all, estimated
by OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable On-time graduation Not completed On-time graduation
Treatment -0.235 (0.008)*** 0.135 (0.006)*** -0.225 (0.009)***
Treatment*reform years -0.067 (0.021)*** -0.009 (0.016) -0.084 (0.022)***
Treatment*post reform years -0.078 (0.029)*** -0.026 (0.022) -0.102 (0.031)***
Years treated 0.055 (0.016)*** 0.009 (0.013) 0.060 (0.017)***
Treatment*Years treated 0.038 (0.006)*** -0.007 (0.004) 0.040 (0.006)***
Included in sample All students All students Students graduated
R-squared 0.201 0.023 0.230
Nr. of observations 46366 46366 37627
Note: In column (1) we impute those not graduated as delayed. In column (3) we exclude
student that did not complete.. Included in all speciﬁcations are year dummies for graduation
year, dummies for length of education program, students' background characteristics and gender
and a constant term. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. */**/*** statistically
signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
graduating on time increases with about 3.8 for each year treated, from a baseline probability
of about 20 percent. However, this is partly oﬀset by a negative constant term, such that for
students treated for four or ﬁve years, the probability of on-time graduation increases by 8-
11 percentage points. Even though the reform was not meant to have an impact graduating
per se, we can not rule out that this was the case. In column (2) the dependent variable is a
dummy which equals one if the student did not complete. All the reform eﬀects are small and
statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the reform did not inﬂuence graduation. Hence, when
excluding student that did not complete (column (3)), it is therefore not surprising that the
eﬀect on completing on time is basically unaltered.
From the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 it is possible to do some back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions of the cost to treat of the reform. With three years of treatment, which about corresponds
to the average for those treated, we get an estimated eﬀect of a reduction of delays by about
0.8 semesters for those graduating during the reform (γˆ1 · 3 + γˆ2 = −0.79, using column (3)
from Table 3). Furthermore, this means an about 4 percentage points increase in the share
graduating on time (γˆ1 · 3 + γˆ2 = −0.036, using column (1) from Table 4). If we extrapolate
the eﬀect of the the reform to six years of treatment - this is an out-of-sample prediction, and
should be interpreted with caution - the duration of most treated program, the corresponding
eﬀects are about 1.5 semesters less delay and 16 percentage points more on time. Thus, with
three years of treatment, for each six restitutions given, in about one case the student graduates
on time because of the reform. With six years of treatment, the corresponding ﬁgure is one for
every 1.8 restitutions given.13
The year-speciﬁc diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates (based on Equation 3) for all three out-
13While we are able to calculate the cost to treat, we can not say anything about the cost beneﬁt of the reform,
because we do not know the costs and beneﬁts of delayed graduation.
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Table 5: Placebo Testing
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Nr of sem delayed On-time graduation Not completed
Treatment 3.680 (0.183)*** -0.264 (0.020)*** 0.142 (0.014)***
Treatment*Year (ref=1989)
-1983 0.081 (0.258) 0.066 (0.028)** 0.026 (0.021)
-1984 0.119 (0.260) 0.015 (0.028) 0.024 (0.021)
-1985 -0.344 (0.272) 0.032 (0.028) -0.027 (0.022)
-1986 -0.275 (0.270) 0.009 (0.028) -0.038 (0.022)*
-1987 0.010 (0.259) 0.025 (0.028) -0.005 (0.020)
-1988 -0.114 (0.266) 0.020 (0.028) -0.007 (0.021)
-1990 -0.219 (0.262) 0.032 (0.028) -0.030 (0.020)
-1991 -0.276 (0.265) -0.008 (0.028) -0.020 (0.021)
-1992 -0.074 (0.256) -0.011 (0.027) 0.003 (0.020)
-1993 -1.198 (0.262)*** 0.105 (0.028)*** -0.061 (0.021)***
-1994 -1.073 (0.246)*** 0.118 (0.026)*** -0.044 (0.019)**
-1995 -1.430 (0.252)*** 0.145 (0.027)*** -0.057 (0.020)***
-1996 -1.455 (0.250)*** 0.120 (0.027)*** -0.051 (0.020)***
-1997 -1.626 (0.243)*** 0.158 (0.026)*** -0.067 (0.019)***
R-squared 0.134 0.201 0.023
Nr. of observations 46366 46366 46366
Note: Included in all speciﬁcations are year dummies for graduation year, dummies for length
of education program, students' background characteristics and gender and a constant term.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. */**/*** statistically signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1
percent level.
come variables (number of semesters delayed, graduating on time, and not completing) are
reported in Table 5. There are no indications of (placebo) reform eﬀects on the number of
semesters delayed before the implementation of the reform. The sign of the estimated coeﬃcients
vary, and none are statistically signiﬁcant. This statistically conﬁrms our impression that the
trends in Figure 1 are parallel, and indicates that our identifying assumption is indeed justiﬁed.
We do ﬁnd two signiﬁcant pre-reform eﬀects for the other two outcomes (one of these, only
at the 10-percent level). However, testing a large number of coeﬃcients, it is not surprising
that some are signiﬁcant. Furthermore, even the signiﬁcant pre-reform estimates are small, and
the pre-reform estimates show no obvious pattern or other indication of pre-reform diﬀerential
trends.
There are also no signiﬁcant reform eﬀects in the three ﬁrst years of the reform, but consistent
positive eﬀects after that. While the reform eﬀect does not increase linearly, the year-speciﬁc
estimates are not very precise, thus we can not rule this out. Taken at face value, the estimates
suggest a slow but lasting impact of the reform. This result may imply that it is particularly
important that treatment starts early and hence complements previous ﬁndings that γ3 < γ2 <
0. The students aﬀected seems to be those with about two or more years left of their studies.
Recall that for the treatment programs a large part of these last two years, was to write a thesis.
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Our year-speciﬁc results seem to indicate that it is important that students are exposed to the
incentive at the latest when starting this part of their studies.
Column (2) presents results for on time graduation. The pattern in this column matches
that in column (1), with indications of a slow but lasting impact. Finally, column (3) shows
the eﬀects on not completion. Unlike in Table 4 we here ﬁnd an eﬀect on the share completing
higher education for the later years. However, this eﬀect is to small to explain the increase in
on time graduation in column (2).
6.1 Sensitivity checks
Restricting the treatment group to the cand.jur (law) program (the program in the treatment
group with most similarities to the programs in the control group) the estimated reform eﬀects
are similar, and generally not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in Table 3. We do see somewhat
smaller overall eﬀects, with delay reduced by on average 0.32 semesters during the reform period
and 0.88 semesters after the reform period. The ﬂexible reform eﬀect is a reduction in delay by
0.22 semesters for each year treated (not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀect in Table 3), but this
is partly oﬀset by positive estimates for γ2 and γ3 (the latter being borderline signiﬁcant). The
fact that students graduating during the reform-period are more delayed (positive γ2) may be
due to a delayed eﬀect, as in Table 5, being the linear approximation to an slow initial response.
The positive γ3, which is the larger but also more imprecise of the two coeﬃcients, indicates
that there is less of a lasting eﬀect of the reform for the law students. Law students initially
treated to a larger degree than other treated students increase their delay at the termination of
the reform. These results are reported in Appendix Table A.3.
Table 6 shows other robustness checks. Each of these control for variables that may poten-
tially have diﬀerent impacts on the treatment and control groups, as discussed in the Empirical
approach section. Column (1) and (2) show that the results are not much aﬀected by controlling
for program-speciﬁc eﬀects or program-speciﬁc linear trends. Because the treatment group is a
sum of speciﬁc programs, we can not simultaneously estimate program-speciﬁc eﬀects and the
diﬀerence between the treatment and control groups. Thus, this coeﬃcient is not reported in
6. Column (3) further adds the (natural) logarithm of the program-speciﬁc cohort size. Larger
numbers of students may mean that average student is weaker and that teaching quality de-
creases. Both should contribute to increase delays. In column (3) we ﬁnd weak evidence of
reduced delays with increasing cohort size, which however does not inﬂuence our estimated re-
form eﬀect. In column (4) we allow the eﬀects of cohort size to diﬀer between the treatment and
control groups. The estimated coeﬃcients are practically identical, thus, this is of little con-
sequence for our results. Finally, in column (5) we control for treatment-speciﬁc eﬀects of the
unemployment-rate at the time of graduation. While we do ﬁnd that increasing unemployment
reduces the delay in the control group relative to the treatment group, our estimated reform
eﬀect is similar to our previous estimates. We have also investigated how the truncation of the
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dependent variable impacts on our results, ﬁnding it to have little signiﬁcance.14
7 Conclusion
Ensuring access and equal opportunity in higher education is a central aim of policy makers. A
pivotal policy instrument in this regard are state-provided grants and favorable students' loans.
However, subsidizing time spent studying in order to increase students' level of attainment may
have undesired consequences in the form of reduced study eﬃciency because the support reduces
the marginal cost of studying.
In this paper we study the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on study duration. Using rich register
data to investigate the eﬀect of a reform that rewarded students who completed their higher
education degree nominally on time in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework. We ﬁnd that the
share of on-time graduation increases by 3.8 percentage points per year treated, from a pre-
reform level of about 20 percent. Thus, a large share of the restitution given will be for students
who would otherwise not have graduated on time. Moreover, in order to capture to overall eﬀect
of the reform, we ﬁnd that the average delay in the treatment group decreased by on average 0.8
semester during the reform period, and by 1.5 semesters in the following two years. The large
eﬀect in the ﬁrst post-reform years points to a strong eﬀect of the duration of the treatment,
with delays reduced by 0.23 semesters per year treated. Furthermore, there is some indication
that it is important that treatment starts before the ﬁnal part of the educational programs,
potentially indicating that early treatment is important to establish eﬃcient study habits. A
series of robustness checks indicate that our estimated eﬀects do not reﬂect diﬀerential trends
or omitted variables.
Our results suggest that students respond quite strongly to the ﬁnancial incentive. Reasons
for this may be that students live on a small budget and are quite constrained ﬁnancially.
Moreover, a restitution of 18 000 NOK may be perceived as a powerful enough incentive to
trigger a change in students study behavior as it roughly corresponds to the monetary gains
associated with a one semester part-time job or alternatively a summer-job. In addition, the
response to the incentive may also indicate that students can quite easily adjust their study
duration and that they understand well the mapping between study eﬀort and study duration.
However, it is diﬃcult to draw clear policy implications from our ﬁndings as we do not
know the underlying mechanisms that are driving these results. Potential mechanisms may
include increased study intensity, for example, by reducing part-time work, or graduation with
less human capital, i.e., lower grades and/or fewer credits. Further research is necessary to
distinguish between such potential mechanisms and to investigate further consequences of the
reform.
14We have estimated our baseline model with the untruncated data on semesters delayed, as well as truncating
on the 10th/90th percentile and on the 1th/99th percentile. Results are omitted for brevity, but available upon
request.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample, in fractions
Outcome variables
Nr of semesters delayed 4.981
Students graduating on time 0.248
Students not completing 0.188
Explanatory variables
Years treated 2.109
Average length of study programs 11.5
Male 0.498
Average age end of high school 19.12
Mother's education
- Compulsory (0-10) 0.156
- Intermediate (11-14 years) 0.495
- Tertiary (15 - 20+) 0.323
- Missing 0.026
Father's education
- Compulsory (0-10) 0.108
- Intermediate (11-14 years) 0.396
- Tertiary (15 - 20+) 0.457
- Missing 0.039
Table A.2: Average number of years enrolled under the reform, by treatment status
Control Group Treatment Group Total
Nr Percent Nr Percent Nr Percent
0 4,960 49.65 14,635 40.23 19,595 42.26
1 613 6.14 2,151 5.91 2,764 5.96
2 643 6.44 2,422 6.66 3,065 6.61
3 1,081 10.82 2,715 7.46 3,796 8.19
4 1,492 14.94 6,728 18.50 8,220 17.73
5 1,200 12.01 7,726 21.24 8,926 19.25
Total 9,989 100 36,377 100 46,366 100
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